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ABSTRACT
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by interpersonal manipulation, callous
affect, erratic lifestyle, and criminal tendencies. Past research has shown that individuals
high in psychopathy feel less empathy than those lower in psychopathy, and that
individuals higher in psychopathy sometimes show impaired morality on moral decision
making tasks. This study examined the relationships between psychopathy, empathy, and
everyday moral decision making; it was hypothesized that individuals higher in total
psychopathy, interpersonal manipulation, and callous affect would score lower on
empathic concern and feelings of wrongness and guilt when completing a moral dilemma
task. To test this hypothesis, 190 undergraduate participants completed a measure of
psychopathy, empathy, and an everyday moral decision making task. Consistent with past
research, results indicated that individuals higher in psychopathy scored lower on measures
of empathy, wrongness, and guilt compared to those lower in psychopathy. Further
analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between psychopathy and moral
decision making once controlling for empathy; results indicated that the strength of
correlations between psychopathy and moral decision making decreased when controlling
for empathy. These findings increase our understanding of the relationship between
psychopathy and moral decision making and imply that empathy plays an important role
in this relationship. This study holds implications for future therapeutic practices for
individuals high in psychopathy and for future research.
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The Relationships Between Psychopathy, Empathy, and Everyday Moral Decision
Making
in an Undergraduate Sample

The United States has an extremely large prison population, and a disproportionate
portion of that population exhibit increased levels of psychopathic personality traits. In the
United States, there are between 15 and 25 percent of the inmate population that are
classified as psychopathic by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), which is
currently the best established test of psychopathy in a forensic population (Hare, 2003;
Skeem et al., 2011). Similar prevalence rates are seen in other countries, such as in the
United Kingdom where there is between a 26 and 28.4 percent psychopathy rate in the
incarcerated population (Hobson & Shine, 1998). In the general population of the United
States, less than one percent can be classified as psychopathic (Hare, 2003; Skeem et al.,
2011).
Deficits in moral processing in individuals high in psychopathy has been
recognized since the establishment of the concept of psychopathy, as psychopathy even
used to be referred to as “moral insanity” (Prichard, 1835). Additionally, it has been
speculated that the reason individuals high in psychopathy may have deficits in moral
reasoning is because of their lower levels of empathy. The associations between
psychopathy, moral decision making, and empathy, however, have yet to be empirically
tested. The purpose of the current research was to investigate the relationship between
psychopathy and moral decision making and to assess whether this relationship can be
explained by the shared relationship with empathy.
Psychopathy
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Psychopathy is a personality disorder comprised of four facets: interpersonal
manipulation, callous affect, erratic lifestyle, and criminal tendencies (Hare, 2003; Skeem
et al., 2011). The interpersonal manipulation facet includes glibness, over inflated sense of
self-worth, and pathological lying. The callous affect facet of psychopathy includes lack of
remorse, shallow affect, lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for actions
(Hare, 2003; Skeem et al, 2011). The erratic lifestyle facet includes having a proneness to
boredom, parasitic lifestyle, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, and
irresponsibility. Lastly, the criminal tendencies facet includes poor behavior controls, early
behavioral problems, juvenile delinquency, revocation of conditional release, and criminal
versatility (Hare, 2003; Skeem et al., 2011).
The PCL-R, which is the measure that has dominated the field and helped to define
psychopathy, is the basis upon which many of the definitions and measures of psychopathy
are based and to which they are compared (Skeem et al., 2011). The PCL-R is used
primarily for clinical and forensic assessments of psychopathy; other measures have been
developed to assess subclinical psychopathy in non-clinical settings such as community or
undergraduate populations, like the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Version III (SRP-III;
Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2015).
Empathy
Empathy can be broadly understood to be an affective state that is caused by the
simulated sharing of emotions with another person (Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser,
McCrory, & Viding, 2011). Empathy is an encompassing term that includes eight
interrelated psychological states: (1) recognizing what a person is feeling, (2) imagining
what another person is thinking, (3) putting oneself in another’s shoes, (4) projecting
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oneself into the state of another person or object, (5) feeling the same as another person,
(6) feeling concern for another based upon their situation, (7) feeling personally distressed
by another’s negative situation, or (8) matching the behavior of another (Batson, 2011).
The first four states can be classified as cognitive empathy, the next three can be classified
as affective empathy, and the last is categorized as behavioral empathy.
Affective empathy, or emotional empathy, can be defined as a subject’s emotional
state resulting from observing or imagining another person’s emotional state. The empathic
state of emotion is isomorphic, but the person experiencing it understands that this
emotional state is a result of a vicarious reaction to an emotional state of another person
(Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011; Singer, 2006). Affective empathy (e.g., feeling the same as
another person, feeling concern for another based upon their situation, and feeling
personally distressed by another’s negative situation) is consistently found to be impaired
in individuals high in psychopathy (Lishner et al., 2012).
Psychopathy and Empathy
In previous research, psychopathy levels were consistently and significantly
associated with low affective empathy levels (Lishner et al., 2015). Research by Glenn,
Iyer, Graham, Koleva and Haidt (2009) showed that higher psychopathy scores are highly
predictive of decreased abilities to take another person’s perspective and decreased
empathic concern for another person in a negative situation. Similar results have been
found in other studies utilizing self-report measures of psychopathy and affective empathy
(Aharoni, Antonenko, & Kiehl, 2011). The diminished capacity to experience affective
empathy is one of the best recognized aspects of psychopathy and has been central to the
concept in its definition as measured by Hare’s PCL-R (Hare, 2003; Lishner et al., 2012).
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Studies have shown that those higher in psychopathy score consistently lower on tests of
empathy than those lower in psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011).
One study done by Seara-Cardoso and colleagues (2011) tested if men higher in
psychopathy could empathize as effectively as men lower in psychopathy when shown
faces depicting different expressions of emotion. Results showed that when compared to
those lower in psychopathy, individuals higher in psychopathy were not able to empathize
as effectively when they were asked to empathize with faces shown to them on a screen
and imagine what emotion that person was feeling. Female samples have similarly shown
that high levels of psychopathic traits are correlated with low scores on empathy tests and
diminished response towards sadness and fearfulness in others (Seara-Cardoso et al.,
2011). Other studies have shown similar results with different prompts. Studies have
examined the empathic concern of those with varying levels of psychopathy when
presented with short stories of others in troubling situations and found similar results: lower
empathic concern ratings in those who are higher in psychopathy when compared to those
lower in psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009).
Examining the relationship between psychopathy and empathy has extended to
brain imaging as well, and is one of the most objective ways to show if there is a differential
relationship between those characterized by psychopathy and those not, as it is impossible
to lie on a brain scan which is characteristic of psychopathy (Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer,
Bartels, & Keysers, 2013). During empathy inducing tasks, Meffert and colleagues (2013)
have shown that in average adult brains certain empathy-related areas consistently show
activity through brain imaging. These areas include the thalamus, hippocampus, portions
of the temporal, frontal, parietal and medial gyrus, and the parietal, temporal, insular, and
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frontal lobes. In psychopathic individuals, brain imaging during the same task showed
reduced activations, especially in the temporal, insular, parietal and the frontal lobes.
These neural markers of empathy showed significant decreases in activity in individuals
higher in psychopathy levels when given empathy tasks which required subjects to feel
emotions of others and witnessing pictures of others expressing emotion (GonzalezLiencres, Shamay-Tsoory, Brune, 2013; Meffert et al., 2013).
Moral Decision Making
The concept of morality is one that has been undergoing change in the past few
decades in the field of psychology. Lawrence Kohlberg was one of the most profound
researchers and theorists in the field and based his concepts of morality around justice for
others (Graham et al., 2011). Graham and colleagues point out that Kohlberg’s theory
focuses on actions taken towards others, specifically how well people treated others. The
most widely accepted definition of the moral domain is "prescriptive judgments of justice,
rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other" (Turiel, 1983, p.
3). Anything that is outside of this definition, such as topics that may be considered moral
decisions for the purposes of topics as religion or politics, are considered to be a non-moral
domain and are not included in this definition.
Central to the psychology of morality is studying moral decision making and moral
judgment (Haidt, 2001). Moral decision making tasks are the most commonly used method
for studying morality and has extensive verification of external validity (Haidt, 2001). One
of the most widely used of the moral dilemmas is what is referred to as the trolley car task
(Greene et al., 2001). The dilemma explains that there is a trolley car going down its tracks
headed straight towards a group of five workers who will be hit and killed by the trolley
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car if it continues on its current path. However, there is a switch that can turn the trolley
car to a second set of tracks that will instead kill three workers on that set of tracks. The
participant is asked to decide if they will allow the trolley car to continue on its current
trajectory, or if they would intervene and cause the trolley car to go down the second set
of tracks (Greene et al., 2001).
Moral decision making can be broken down into two aspects: impersonal moral
actions and personal moral actions (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010). Impersonal moral
actions are actions that have some sort of disconnect between the person choosing the
action and the people that it is affecting (Cima et al., 2010). Using the trolley car dilemma
as an example, this would be similar to the scenario presented as the trolley car is moving
towards five people but you can change the direction of the track to hit only one person. In
this scenario, the participant would be asked to choose between five people dying and one
person dying but still have the moral ambiguity of not directly killing either the five or one
person, whichever group they choose to live and die. On the other hand, personal moral
actions involve moral actions that are directly involved in the situation and there is no
disconnect between the people and the decision (Cima et al., 2010). Still using the trolley
car example, this could manifest in the participant being forced to choose between five
people dying if they do nothing, or one person dying if they directly push another person
onto the track in front of the moving trolley. The end result is still the same, one person
dying or five people dying, but when given a personal moral action the participant is given
a more direct influence and is made to feel more responsible for the outcome of the situation
rather than being able to take themselves out of the situation to make the decision an
impersonal moral action (Cima et al., 2010).
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Psychopathy and Moral Judgment
Individuals high in psychopathy are often associated with immoral and sometimes
violent behavior, and this leads to a prison sentence at a much higher rate than individuals
low in psychopathy (Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008). Given similar situations,
individuals low in psychopathy and individuals high in psychopathy rate impersonal moral
actions as morally permissible (Cima et al., 2010). However, individuals higher in
psychopathy rate personal moral actions as more morally permissible than individuals
lower in psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010). Therefore, even though individuals high in
psychopathy show diminished emotional processing, they are either able to maintain a level
of emotional processing high enough for the purpose of the study or were able to carry out
the task in a “normal” way without normal emotional processing (Cima et al., 2010).
However, individuals high in psychopathy also showed a higher acceptance of morally
inappropriate actions than those who are lower in levels of psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010).
In the past, research focusing on the relationship between psychopathy and moral
or ethical decision making has sometimes shown that people higher in psychopathy scored
similarly as those lower in psychopathy (Aharoni et al., 2011). These results have led to
the theory that those high in psychopathy are able to recognize what it is that most people
would consider to be a moral dilemma and are able to choose what most people would
choose when asked to make a decision. Researchers who have looked at this relationship
between psychopathy and moral decision making have hypothesized that at the heart of
psychopathy lies a disconnect between emotional processing and control of behavior,
rather than the ability to tell which decision is considered to be the moral choice. Therefore,
those high in psychopathy may be able to tell which choice they should make but don’t
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choose that option (Aharoni et al., 2011). Research has also shown that people high in
psychopathy have a reduced value of harm prevention and fairness, but this cannot be
explained simply by the inability to distinguish right and wrong (Aharoni et al., 2011).
Therefore, there must be another factor in their emotional processing that contributes to
this lack of moral values.
Another theory arose from a study conducted by Cardinale and Marsh (2014),
where the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making was examined.
They found that individuals higher in psychopathy show impaired moral reasoning in
moral decision making tasks involving causing others emotional distress (in this case
specifically fear), while finding very minimal impairment when situations involving
physical harm were presented (Cardinale & Marsh, 2014). Cardinale and Marsh theorized
that the inconsistency in past studies in the associations between psychopathy and moral
decision making has been that the scenarios show individuals experiencing varying levels
of fear in the scenario. This variation in fear levels could be affecting the decision made
on the moral decision tasks for individuals high in psychopathy (Cardinale & Marsh,
2014).
Current Study and Hypotheses
Those high in psychopathy are low in affective empathy and make different moral
decisions than those lower in psychopathy during some decision making tasks but not
others (Hare, 2003; Lishner et al., 2012). It has been suggested that individuals high in
psychopathy understand what the correct moral decision is when making a moral decision
not based upon emotional distress, but they have a disconnect in their emotional processing
which contributes to the past varied results in psychopathy and moral decision making
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research (Cima et al., 2010). It has also been shown that at the core of psychopathy lies a
decreased ability to experience affective empathy (Cima et al., 2010). Some researchers
have assumed that a lack of empathy explains why individuals higher in psychopathy have
reduced moral decision making. However, to date, research has yet to empirically examine
the relationships between psychopathy, moral decision making, and empathy. The current
study aimed to investigate and clarify these relationships. We hypothesized that total SRPIII Psychopathy scores, Interpersonal Manipulation, and Callous Affect would all have
significant, negative correlations with empathic concern because in past research,
psychopathy has been shown to be negatively correlated with empathy (Lishner et al.,
2015). It was also hypothesized that Interpersonal Manipulation and Callous Affect would
show significant, negative relationships with guilt, wrongness and empathic concern as
both IPM and CA have shown to have similar negative relationships with empathic concern
(Lishner et al., 2015). We also hypothesized that psychopathy and moral decision making
would be significantly related because of their shared relationships with empathy. The
specific hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 - Total SRP-III psychopathy scores would have significant negative
relationships with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision making task.
Hypothesis 2 – The facet of Interpersonal Manipulation would have significant negative
relationships with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision making
task.
Hypothesis 3- The facet of Callous Affect would have significant negative relationships
with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern on a moral decision making task.
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Hypothesis 4- The relationships between psychopathy and guilt and wrongness on a moral
decision making task would be reduced or eliminated when controlling for levels of
empathy.
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Method
Participants
Recruitment. A total of 238 undergraduates from Georgia Southern University
were recruited through the university’s online SONA survey system. Individuals 18 and
older were eligible for the study, and there were no race, major, or gender restrictions. Each
participant earned course credit or extra credit towards a psychology course as an incentive
to participate in the study.
Demographics. After data were downloaded from the Qualtrics software, analyses
were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 23.0). This study included a sample of
190 participants after excluding 48 participants for not correctly answering all 5 catch
questions. Participants included in the study consisted of 67 men (35.3%) and 123 women
(64.7%) aged from 18 to 37 (M = 19.65, SD = 2.18). Of the 190 participants, 115 (60.5%)
identified as White or Caucasian, 53 (27.9%) identified as Black or African American, 6
(3.2%) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 4 (2.1%) identified as Asian American, 1 (0.5%)
identified as American Indian, 9 (4.7%) identified as Multiple Ethnicities, and 2 (1.1%)
identified as Other. See Table 1 for additional demographics.
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Table 1
Demographic Information

Age

Gender
Female
Male
Race/Ethnicity
White or Caucasian
African American or Black
Hispanic or Latino
Asian or Pacific Islander
Multiracial
Other
Level in School
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
Greater than 4th year

M
19.65

SD
2.19

N

%

123
67

64.7
35.3

115
53
6
4
9
2

60.5
27.9
3.2
2.1
4.7
1.1

88
45
41
9
7

46.3
23.7
21.6
4.7
3.7

Materials
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Version The SRP-III is a 64 question self-report
questionnaire that uses the four facets of psychopathy used by the PCL-R (Skeem et al,
2011). These are interpersonal manipulation (IPM), callous affect (CA), erratic lifestyle
(ELS), and criminal tendencies (CT). Participants were given Likert-style questions
ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Using the following key,
individual facet scores for each participant were calculated, with an R indicating a reverse
coding for that question.


Interpersonal Manipulation: 3, 8, 13, 16R, 20, 24R, 27, 31R, 35, 38R, 41, 45,
50, 54, 58, and 61R
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Callous Affect: 2, 7, 11R, 15, 19R, 23R, 26R, 30, 33, 37, 40, 44R, 48, 53, 56,
and 60



Erratic Lifestyle: 1, 4, 9, 14R, 17, 22R, 25R, 28, 32, 36R, 39, 42, 47R, 51, 55,
and 59



Criminal Tendencies: 5R, 6R, 10, 12, 18R, 21R, 29, 34R, 43, 46R, 49, 52, 57,
62, 63, and 64

Example questions for each facet include:


Interpersonal Manipulations: “I purposely flatter people to get them on my side”



Callous Affect: “I don’t bother to keep in touch with my family anymore”



Erratic Lifestyle: “I’ve often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it”



Criminal Tendencies: “I have broken into a building or vehicle in order to steal
something or vandalize”

The SRP–III was developed to measure psychopathy in undergraduates rather than
an incarcerated population which is why it was used in this study (Hare, 2003). The SRPIII is most commonly used measure in non-clinical samples (which are usually
undergraduate college students) and has been extensively validated to do so (Skeem et al.,
2011). Consistent with past research (Lishner et al., 2012; Lishner et al., 2015), the SRPIII total scale (α=.92) and the individual facets (Interpersonal Manipulation α=.85, Callous
Affect α=.78, Erratic Lifestyle α=.77, and Criminal Tendencies α=.73) showed acceptable
to excellent internal consistency.
Moral Dilemmas and Empathic Concern. The moral dilemmas used in this study
were adapted from a moral dilemmas task created by Seara-Cardozo and colleagues (2011).
We adapted the items to better fit a United States undergraduate population. An example
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of a moral dilemma in this task is “You are walking down the street on your way to class
when you spot a wallet lying on the ground. You pick up the wallet and see that there are
several hundred dollars inside. You really need money to pay for textbooks, so you decide
to keep the cash and leave the rest of the wallet on the ground.” Participants were then
asked “How guilty would you feel?” to measure guilt, “How wrong would this be?” to
measure wrongness, “How much compassion do you feel for the other person in the
situation?” to measure compassion, and “How much sympathy do you feel for the other
person in the situation?” to measure sympathy. Participants were given Likert-style
responses to the questions ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A Lot). The responses to the
questions asking for compassion and sympathy were combined to create a total empathic
concern score. The responses to the 15 morality items were averaged to create an average
wrongness score, guilt score, and empathic concern score. For the current study, response
scores for wrongness (α = .85), guilt (α = .89), and empathic concern (α = .95) showed
good to excellent internal consistency.
Demographics. Participants completed a demographics measure asking for age,
gender, racial/ethnic identity, level in school, major in school, primary language, and
fluency in English. A full version of this measure can be found in Appendix B.
Procedure
Each participant was given access to the study through the Georgia Southern SONA
system, which directed them to the online research survey on Qualtrics to be completed at
a time and place of their choosing. Upon accessing the study, participants first read an
informed consent (Appendix A) which asked for a digital signature after careful reading.
Upon completion participants were prompted with the SRP-III, which was untimed. After
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completing the SRP-III participants were then directed to the Moral Dilemmas and
Empathic Concern Task. Participants were given 13 seconds to read each scenario, then
another 13 seconds to read the second part of the dilemma where action was taken by the
individual in the scenario. Thirteen seconds was determined by pretesting the materials,
where participants noted that 13 seconds was adequate time to spend with each section
without being too much time so that there was much, if any, extra time. Participants then
completed questions concerning guilt, wrongness, compassion, and sympathy. After the
Moral Dilemmas task, participants completed the demographics questionnaire. Participants
were then prompted with a screen with instructions to send an email to a set address to
receive course credit for the study.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics including Cronbach’s Alpha, mean, standard deviation, and
range were calculated for each measure used in this study, and each facet of the measures
(SRP-III Total, Interpersonal Manipulation, Callous Affect, Erratic Lifestyle, Criminal
Tendencies, Wrongness, Guilt, and Empathic Concern). Detailed results can be found in
Table 2.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures
Scale

Alpha

M

SD

Range

Possible Min
and Max
Range

Psychopathy
SRP-Total
SRP-IPM
SRP-CA
SRP-ELS
SRP-CT

.92
.85
.78
.77
.73

144.23
39.87
37.59
42.04
24.73

26.71
9.27
8.28
8.57
6.94

73-213
19-61
18-56
18-63
16-49

64-320
16-80
16-80
16-80
16-80

Guilt
Wrongness
Empathic Concern

.89
.85
.96

5.85
6.00
5.68

0.93
0.73
0.97

2.73-7
3.87-7
2.87-7

1-7
1-7
1-7

Gender Differences
A series of between-subjects independent samples t-tests were conducted to
examine potential gender differences for psychopathy, guilt, wrongness and empathic
concern. Results showed that men scored significantly higher on psychopathy, and
significantly lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern than did women. Detailed
gender statistics can be found in Table 3.
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Table 3
Gender Group Statistics
Measure
Psychopathy
SRP-Total
SRP-IPM
SRP-CA
SRP-ELS
SRP-CT

Gender
Men
Women
Men
Women
Men
Women
Men
Women
Men
Women

N

M

SD

67 157.63 22.80
123 136.94 25.92
67 43.73 8.73
123 37.76 8.90
67 42.09 6.34
123 35.15 8.20
67 44.73 6.74
123 40.58 9.11
67 27.07 7.54
123 23.45 6.25

t

dF

p

d

5.48

188

<.001***

0.85

4.44

188

<.001***

0.68

6.02

188

<.001***

0.95

3.57

171

.001***

0.52

3.36

115

.001***

0.52

Guilt

Men
67
5.65
1.01 -2.12 120
0.33
.04*
Women 123 5.96
0.87
Wrongness
Men
67
5.81
0.77 -2.76 188
.006** 0.41
Women 123 6.11
0.69
Empathic Concern
Men
67
5.48
0.96 -2.09 188
0.32
.04*
Women 123 5.79
0.97
*. Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **. Mean difference is
significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

Correlational Analyses
In order to assess relationships between all dependent variables, correlational
analyses were computed using Person’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r) and
reported in Table 4. Analyses showed large positive association between total psychopathy
scores and all four facet scores, as well as large positive association among facet scores.
Analyses also showed large positive association between guilt, wrongness, and empathic
concern.
As hypothesized, for guilt felt during the moral decision making task and
psychopathy, there was a large negative association between ratings of guilt and total
psychopathy scores, a large negative association between ratings of guilt and IPM traits,
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and a large negative association between ratings of guilt and CA traits. There was also a
moderate negative association between ratings of guilt and ELS traits, and a moderate
negative correlation between rating of guilt and CT traits.
As hypothesized, for wrongness felt during the moral decision making task and
psychopathy, there was a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness and
total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness
and IPM traits, and a moderate negative association between ratings of wrongness and CA
traits. There was also a weak negative association between wrongness and ELS traits, and
a weak negative association between wrongness and CT traits.
As hypothesized, for empathic concern felt during the moral decision making task
and psychopathy, there was a moderate negative association between empathic concern
and total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between empathic concern
and IPM traits, and a strong negative association between empathic concern and CA traits.
Additionally there was also a moderate negative association between empathic concern and
ELS traits, and there was a moderate negative association between empathic concern and
CT traits.
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Table 4
Correlational Analyses
2.
3.
4.
---1
--1
-.618**
1
.629** .516**
.530** .366** .499**
.531** .518** .345**
7. Wrongness
-.486**
.480** .491** .287**
8. Empathic
-.475**
Concern
.430** .515** .323**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
1. SRP-Total
2. SRP-IPM
3. SRP-CA
4. SRP-ELS
5. SRP-CT
6. Guilt

1.
1
.878**
.785**
.829**
.717**
-.539**

5.
----1
-.321**

6.
----------1

-.290** .855**

7.
-------------

8.
-------------

1

---

-.234** .830** .799**

1

In order to assess relationships between all dependent variables after controlling for
empathic concern, partial correlational analyses were computed and are reported in Table
5. Analyses showed moderate to large positive correlations between total psychopathy
scores and all four facet scores. Analyses also showed a large positive correlation between
guilt and wrongness.
For guilt felt during the moral decision making task and psychopathy after
controlling for empathy, there was a weak negative association between ratings of guilt
and total psychopathy scores, a moderate negative association between ratings of guilt and
IPM traits, and a weak negative association between ratings of guilt and CA traits. There
was also a weak negative correlation between ratings of guilt and ELS traits, and a weak
negative association between ratings of guilt and CT traits.
For wrongness felt during the moral decision making task and psychopathy after
controlling for empathy, there was a weak negative association between ratings of
wrongness and total psychopathy, a weak negative association between ratings of
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wrongness and IPM traits, and a weak negative association between ratings of wrongness
and CT traits. There was also a weak negative association between wrongness and CT
traits, and there was no association between wrongness and ELS traits.
In comparison with analyses run before controlling for empathic concern, analyses
after controlling for empathic concern showed decreased strength of all associations
examined in this study.

Table 5
Correlational Analyses after Controlling for Empathic Concern
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1. SRP-Total
1
--------2. SRP-IPM
1
-------.848***
3. SRP-CA
1
------.716***
.513***
4. SRP-ELS
1
-----.811***
.574***
.431***
5. SRP-CT
1
----.705***
.486***
.290*** .458***
6. Guilt
1
---.294***
-.345***
-.190** -.146**
-221**
7.
-.050
1
-.204**
-.251***
-.155*
-.165** .572***
Wrongness
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the
0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Discussion
The purpose of this research was to assess the relationship between psychopathy, empathy,
and everyday moral decision making in an undergraduate sample. Specifically, this study
examined how much of a role empathy plays in everyday moral decision making tasks when
examining psychopathy levels.
Gender differences were examined for psychopathy and findings were consistent with past
research. Men scored higher on average in every facet of psychopathy, as well as in total
psychopathy. This is consistent with past research which has shown that men on average score
higher than women on psychopathy measures (Glenn, 2009; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2013).
Additionally, this study found that men scored significantly lower than did women on empathic
concern, wrongness, and guilt. This is consistent with past research as men score higher on average
on psychopathy tests, and lower on empathy tests when compared to women (Lishner et al., 2015;
Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011).
Hypothesis 1 stated that participants that scored higher in total psychopathy would score
lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern. Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals who scored
high in IPM traits would score lower on guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern. Additionally,
hypothesis 3 stated that participants that scored high in CA traits would also score lower on guilt,
wrongness, and empathic concern. Hypothesis 4 stated that the relationships between psychopathy
and moral decision making would be reduced when controlling for levels of empathy. All of these
hypotheses were supported by the results of this study. Congruent with past research, results
suggest that psychopathy does play an important role in the amount of empathy, guilt and
wrongness felt by participants in everyday moral dilemmas. In addition to finding that SRP-III
psychopathy scores, IPM traits, and CA traits all had strong, significant, negative correlations with
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guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern, this study also showed that ELS traits and CT traits also
showed moderate significant negative correlations with guilt, wrongness, and empathic concern.
These results are similar to past research when looking at the relationships between psychopathy
and empathy (Lishner et al., 2015) and help to clarify the ambiguous relationship between
psychopathy and moral decision making. Current results indicate that individuals higher in
psychopathy rated the personal moral dilemmas used in this study as less wrong, and they would
feel less guilt, showing similarities to research which has shown that individuals high in
psychopathy rate personal moral dilemmas as more permissible (Cima et al., 2010).
Partial correlations controlling for empathic concern were conducted to determine the
strength of the association between psychopathy and moral decision making when empathy was
removed. After controlling for empathy, the strengths of the associations decreased, but were still
significant in all relationships except for the relationship between ELS traits and wrongness. Total
SRP-III psychopathy scores were still significantly correlated with both guilt and wrongness
however the strength of the correlations were reduced from strong to moderate. This same
reduction in correlation strength from strong to moderate was also observed in ELS traits and CA
traits where strengths of correlations were similarly reduced from strong to moderate when
compared to guilt and wrongness. After controlling for empathic concern, there was also a decrease
shown in the relationship between ELS traits and guilt and wrongness, as well as a decrease shown
in the relationships between CT traits and guilt and wrongness. The relationship between ELS
traits and wrongness before controlling for empathic concern was a moderate strength. After
controlling for empathic concern, there was no longer a relationship between the two variables.
The relationship between ELS traits and guilt also decreased, to a small relationship. The
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relationships between CT traits and both guilt and wrongness both decreased from moderate to
small when empathic concern was controlled for.
This decrease in strength of correlations supports the theory that empathy plays a role in
moral decision making for individuals high in psychopathy. Past research has shown that empathy
is decreased in individuals high in psychopathy, and has also shown that individuals high in
psychopathy rate personal moral dilemmas as more permissible than individuals low in
psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010; Lishner et al., 2015). The variation in the results from past research
regarding the relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making could be explained by
the fact that individuals high in psychopathy may make different decisions on moral decision
making tasks when the tasks have a clear individual with which the participants are supposed to
empathize. This may give participants who are lower in psychopathy the opportunity to empathize
with these individuals and make a decision that those higher in psychopathy would not make as
they do not empathize as much with targets in the moral dilemmas. The fact that the relationships
between the facets of interpersonal manipulation and callous affect and levels of guilt and
wrongness were reduced, but not eliminated when controlling for empathy suggests that empathy
is not the only factor that links psychopathy and moral decision making.
Implications for Research and Practice
The results of this study help to show that the relationship between psychopathy and
everyday moral decision making is related to empathy levels. While this is a preliminary study and
needs more research to fully explore all theoretical and practical implications of this finding, it
does help to give a possible direction for future research. Future research investigating the
relationship between psychopathy and moral decision making should take into account empathy
levels for the other individuals in the dilemmas. For instance, if the scenario presented is a personal
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dilemma that involves one specific person for the participant to be able to empathize with, future
researchers should expect to see that participants higher in psychopathy will score differently than
those who are lower in psychopathy, since those higher in psychopathy will not empathize as well
as with the individual in the scenario compared to those lower in psychopathy. Further research
needs to be done to determine if the results of this study will be replicated for similar but not
identical methodologies, such as looking at non-undergraduate populations, dilemmas that are not
considered to be every day, and dilemmas that do not specify one particular person to feel empathy
towards. However, these preliminary findings could hold implications for future directions for
therapeutic techniques for individuals who are higher in psychopathy. These implications include
possible empathy exercises for those higher in psychopathy to try to increase the amount of
empathy felt for others in negative situations. This could help to improve personal moral decision
making.
Limitations
This study had several limitations that could be worth exploring in future research. This
study used self-report measures to assess all of the variables of the study including psychopathy,
empathy, guilt, and wrongness. There is no way to know if participants responded truthfully to all
questionnaires or not. For future research, it may be possible to use observational measures of
psychopathy and empathy rather than self-report measures. This study also used a convenience
sample of only undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at Georgia Southern
University. Future research could expand on this by applying the concepts to a diverse population
with a wider range of ages, educational backgrounds, and locations that this study did not include.
This study also did not manipulate any variables so causation cannot be implied. Future research
could attempt to manipulate the variables in this study to test for causal relationships between
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psychopathy, empathy, and moral decision making. Future research could also explore mediation
models to see if empathy partially or fully mediates the relationships between psychopathy and
moral decision making.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of this research showed that empathy plays a role in moral
decision making for those high in psychopathy. Individuals higher in psychopathy feel less
empathy for those in personal moral decision making tasks and find the negative action taken
towards the individuals in the tasks to be less wrong than those who are lower in psychopathy.
This is a field that needs more research to explore what factors are contributing towards the
differences in moral decision making by individuals lower and higher in psychopathy.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent
Personality and Moral Judgment Survey
This study is being conducted by Justin Kemple, Courtney Beussink, and Dr. Amy Hackney. Justin
Kemple is an undergraduate student, Courtney Beussink is a student in the Master’s Experimental
Psychology, and Dr. Amy Hackney is a faculty member of the Psychology Department at Georgia
Southern University.
The purpose of this research is to assess the relationship between personality and moral judgments.
Participation in this research will include completing questionnaires assessing beliefs on various
topics, a questionnaire assessing personality, and a demographics questionnaire.
Risks associated with this experiment are no greater than those found in common everyday
activities, such as reading or watching the news, or viewing social media. Possible risks include
slight physical or mental discomfort due to the content of some of the questions.
Participation in this study will not benefit you directly. However, your participation may benefit
others by contributing to a body of knowledge that can be used to improve our understanding of
how certain factors may affect decision making.
Participation in this study will take approximately 30 minutes.
This study is completely anonymous. Your name and any other identifying information will not
be linked with any information you provide nor will it be attached to or stored with your responses.
All data will be stored on a password protected data file for at least seven years and only the
research team will have access to the data. Deidentified or coded data from this study may be
placed in a publically available repository for study validation and further research. You will not
be identified in the data set or any reports using information obtained from this study and your
confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and
data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and
institutions. Your name and other identifying information will never be reported in connection
with your responses. The fact that you completed this study will remain anonymous to the fullest
extent of the law.
Participants have the right to ask questions and have those questions answered. If you have
questions about this study, please contact the primary researcher, whose contact information is
located on SONA. For questions concerning your rights as a research participant, contact Georgia
Southern University Office of Research Services and Sponsored Programs at 912-478-0843.
Your participation in this study will fulfill 0.5 credit units of your “experiment participation”
assignment in your Introduction to Psychology course (please see the handout provided in your
class for details regarding your assignment). If you have met the criteria for that assignment, your
participation in this study will provide you with 0.5 units of extra credit toward your grade if
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allowed by your instructor. Students enrolled in courses other than Introduction to Psychology
who wish to participate will receive credit that will be decided by your course instructor. You will
have other opportunities to fulfill this course requirement if you choose not to participate in this
study by participating in another or completing an alternative assignment.
You may withdraw from this study at any time. If you decide not to participate, please contact the
primary researcher. You may stop at any time during the study and you may withdraw your data
after completing the experiment. You may also skip any question that causes discomfort or
distress. Completion of the survey implies that you agree to participate and your data may be used
in this research. There is no penalty for deciding not to participate in the study. You may decide at
any time you don’t want to participate further and may withdraw without penalty or retribution.
You must be 18 years of age or older to consent to participate in this research study. Since we
cannot obtain your signature, we must obtain your consent through other means. If you have read
and understood the instructions and terms of this study and would like to participate as a volunteer,
please click the "I Agree" box below and click >> to begin the survey. If you do not wish to take
this survey or are hesitant about participating, check the “I Disagree” box below and then click >>
to exit out of the survey.
You may print a copy of this consent form to keep for your records. This project has been reviewed
and approved by the GSU Institutional Review Board under tracking number H16313.
I have read and understood the above consent form and wish to participate in this study.
I Agree

I Disagree
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Appendix B
Demographics Questionnaire
INSTRUCTIONS: Complete the following demographic information. Please note that all
personal information will be kept completely confidential and none of the responses you
provide will be connected to your name, email address, or other identifying information.
1.

Age (in years): ________

2.

Gender (Select one):
Female
Male

Transgender (specify) _______

Other (specify) _______

3.

Which of the following best describes your racial/ethnic identity? (Select all that apply)
African American or Black
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian or Pacific Islander
Hispanic or Latino
White or Caucasian
Other (specify) ________________

4.

Which of the following best describes your level in school? (Select one)
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
Other (specify) _______

5.

What is your major in school? ________________

6.

Is English your primary language?
Yes
No

7.

Would you consider yourself fluent in English?
Yes
No

